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Abstract—Voting over the internet has been the focus of signifi-
cant research with the potential to solve many problems. Current
implementations typically suffer from a lack of transparency,
where the connection between vote casting and result tallying
is seen as a black box by voters. A new protocol was recently
proposed that allows full transparency, never obfuscating any
step of the process, and splits authority between mutually-
constraining conflicting parties. Achieving such transparency
brings with it challenging issues. In this paper we propose an
efficient algorithm for generating unique, anonymous identifiers
(voting locations) that is based on the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, extend the functionality of an election to allow for
races with multiple winners, and introduce a prototype of this
voting system implemented as a multiplatform web application.
Index Terms—Internet Voting; E-Voting; Anonymous; Trans-
parent; Secret Sharing; Chinese Remainder Theorem; Mutually
Restraining
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet voting has been an active research topic in recent
years. One clear advantage is allowing people to vote from
anywhere at anytime, as long as they have a computer. Many
experimental systems have been proposed; Some [17] require
physical settings like voting booths. Some [16], [5], [15],
[14], [19] require special hardware such as a tamper resistant
randomizer, verification module, or smart cards. Two systems,
Helios [2] and Preˆt a` Voter [9], have been used for university
elections [3], [6]. Punchscan/Scantegrity [10] is a security
enhancement for traditional optical scan voting systems and
has been used for voting experiments. Internet voting has even
been used for large scale political elections in several nations
including Estonia [21].
As critics are quick to point out, conducting an election via
the internet exposes it to a wide variety of attack [20]. They
are correct: due to poor security practice [23], vulnerabilities
in web browsers [13], or other methods of attack, internet
voting does carry significant risk. However, it also brings with
it significant benefits. The more convenient voting process has
been shown to increase turnout in low-stakes elections (such
as city-level officials) [11], its more centralized and automated
nature allows the election to be managed by security profes-
sionals instead of untrained volunteers, and the ability to make
results transparent exposes alterations to the tally and assures
voters that their votes is in the tally and was counted correctly.
Meanwhile, traditional paper-ballot elections are extremely
prone to error [4]. Elections are conducted with only cur-
sory attention to security, with ballots stored in unattended,
unmarked boxes and in the trunks of cars. Electronic ballot
readers are no better: they often run proprietary firmware
that is vulnerable to attack, and just like the paper ballots
they are frequently stored with no concern for security, in
places like school gymnasiums or officials’ garages. Internet
voting carries risks, that much is certain, but the traditional
alternatives are just as bad or even worse, and internet voting
brings great advantages as well [7].
Unlike most other online applications, internet voting
has strict requirements, including verifiability, accountability,
receipt-freeness, and coercion-resistance. These requirements
pose many challenges, and some of them are even conflicting:
for example, an inherent tradeoff exists between anonymity
versus verifiability. A perfectly anonymous voting system
would perfectly preserve voter privacy, but since their ballots
have no connection at all to themselves, voters would have
no ability to verify that their vote was counted correctly,
eliminating one of the key advantages of internet voting.
While many internet voting systems exist, most obfuscate
the transition from casting ballots to tallying results. For
example, mixnet-based voting systems [8] such as Helios and
Preˆt a` Voter display the full contents of all ballots, but use
a secret permutation to disassociate them from the voters
who cast them. They can assure voters their ballot is in the
tally only with a mathematical proof. Proofs may satisfy a
mathematician or computer scientist, but most elections are
not held strictly among such people. Estonia’s system also
lacks transparency, as pointed out by election observers [21].
Additionally, Helios, Preˆt a` Voter, and Scantegrity have been
found to be exceptionally low in usability [1]. Seeing a web
page tell voters their ballot was counted or seeing a long
display of math is not as assuring as being able to look directly
at their ballot within the tally, know that it is theirs (while
no one else does) and see for themselves that its choices are
exactly as they intended them.
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The protocol in the INFOCOM’14 paper [25] is fully
transparent: it removes the obfuscation or gap in the transition
from casting secret ballots to tallying individual votes. Thus,
it offers two types of assurance to voters. One is vote-casting
assurance on “secret” ballots. Every voter can identify their
ballot as their own and ensure the contents are what they cast,
providing individual verification in a way that less transparent
protocols cannot. This does not endanger the privacy of any
voter, but because nothing about the election’s results is
available to anyone until all votes have been cast, this allows
for anyone to ensure that the ballots are not tampered with after
the election results become known. The other assurance relates
to vote-tallying: a voter is assured that the vote is viewably
counted in the final tally. Anyone can see the contents of
all votes and verify for themselves that the tally is accurate,
providing universal verification.
Unfortunately, the protocol as it was described at IN-
FOCOM suffers from two main issues. First, the location
anonymization scheme that allows individual verifiability may
not be efficient. It requires multiple synchronized rounds of
activity between all voters, which could slow the election to a
halt and annoy the voters. Additionally, the protocol currently
could only handle one-winner scenarios, while in many real
life elections multiple winners are allowed.
In this paper, we present our contributions to the afore-
mentioned issues. First, we propose an efficient algorithm for
generating unique, anonymous voting locations that runs in
constant time without need for synchronization among voters,
based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem. Second, we extend
the functionality of an election to allow for races with multiple
winners. Third, we introduce a prototype of this voting system
implemented as a multiplatform web application.
The rest of this paper is laid out as follows. In section II
we briefly introduce our voting protocol included in INFO-
COM’14 [25]. In Section III we discuss the enhancements we
have made to the protocol. In Section IV we introduce the
implemented prototype we have developed. Section V com-
pares our improved protocol with the original and discusses
scalability. We conclude in Section VI.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL
In this section, we give an overview of the mutually
restraining e-voting protocol presented in the INFOCOM’14
paper [25], summarizing the assumptions and stages involved
in the protocol.
A. Assumptions
Suppose there are N (N > 3) voters denoted Vi where
1 ≤ i ≤ N , M candidates being voted on, and 2 authorities
(called Collectors) denoted C1 and C2 who have conflicting
interests that prohibit them from colluding but who cooperate
to follow the protocol. The assumption of multiple conflict-
of-interest authorities was previously proposed by Moran and
Naor [17], and applied to real world scenarios like the multi-
party political system in the US. The protocol can support any
number of collectors ≥ 2, but we limit the count to 2 in this
paper for simplicity. The protocol ensures that neither collector
working alone can produce a partial tally (seeing in-progress
results before the election is complete) with the information
they have, or decrypt any voter’s secret ballot.
The majority of voters are assumed to be benign. This
assumption is reasonable since the colluding majority can
easily control the election result otherwise. Secure unicast
channels between a voter and each authority are assumed.
Public key based cryptosystems can be applied to provide such
channels.
B. Five Stages of the Protocol
1) Initialization: Voter Vi’s choice is represented by a bit
string of length M , called a voting vector, where each bit
corresponds to a candidate. Vi chooses exactly one candidate
to vote for, sets that bit to 1, and all others to 0. Vi then
obtains a unique, secret number Li called a voting location.
The concatenation of all voting vectors ordered by voting
location produces a tallied voting vector that allows universal
verifiability and, since voting locations are known to the voter
and only to the voter, individual verifiability. By left-shifting
each voting vector by Li×M bits, this concatenation may be
achieved by summing all voting vectors.
2) Vote Casting: Each voter encrypts their shifted voting
vectors to create their secret ballot using Simplified-(N,N)-
Secret Sharing [24], an additively homomorphic cryptosystem
that ensures that the sum of all secret ballots is the same as
the sum of all plaintext voting vectors. Generation of secret
cryptographic shares is split among the collectors, so no one
party ever possesses enough information to decrypt any voter’s
submission, and no partial tally is possible because the final
sum is created only when all voters vote. Secret ballots may be
made public on an In-Progress Bulletin Board so that anyone
may see encrypted submissions as they come in.
3) In-Process Check and Enforcement: Voters share the bit-
wise reverse of their shifted voting vector the same way. Since
voters must set exactly one bit to 1 and all others to 0, the
product of (plaintext) forwards and reverse equals 2N×M−1
regardless of which bit the voter chooses. The collectors may
obtain this product without exposing the plaintext using Secure
Two Party Multiplication [18], thus ensuring that a malicious
voter cannot vote multiple times and cannot deliberately avoid
voting.
4) Collection / Tally: The collectors each calculate the
sum of all secret ballots to produce the tallied voting vector
and analyse it to determine the winner(s) of the election.
Additionally, because secret ballots are made public, any third
party can perform the same calculation.
5) Verification: As mentioned, any third party can indepen-
dently tally the results to ensure that they are accurate and,
since partial tallies are impossible, any third party may check
that submissions at the end are not altered from their original
state, ensuring the results have not been tampered with, pro-
viding universal verifiability. Additionally, because individual
ballots (voting vectors) are ordered by voting location, each
voter may find his or her ballot within the tally and verify that
the choice is exactly what they intended, providing individual
verifiability.
C. Drawbacks
The original algorithm for location anonymity was highly
secure (only direct collusion between collectors could violate
voter privacy; just as with voting) but it was inefficient. Voters
chose their locations at random, shared them as they would
voting choices, and if any voters chose the same number all
voters must go again until there is no collision. This requires an
unknown number of synchronized rounds of activity between
all voters, and is not ideal.
Additionally, since exactly one bit must be cast by each
voter, elections that involve multiple votes among a pool of
candidates were not supported. In Section III we introduce a
new location finding algorithm that runs in a single step with
no need for synchronized sessions of activity, as well as a
workaround to the multiple voting issue.
III. PROTOCOL ENHANCEMENTS
In this section, we introduce the new enhancements to the
protocol. We have created a new algorithm for generating
voting locations, that runs in constant time with no need for
synchronized activity between voters. Additionally, we have
developed a way to allow voters to vote for multiple distinct
candidates without violating the protocol.
A. Enhanced Location Anonymization
Each voter must have a unique voting location. This is
defined as a number Li that is unique among all voters, yet is
known only to the voter to whom it belongs to. We thus require
a function, f(A,B, i) = Li that produces unique output Li for
Vi with unique inputs A and B. A and B are sets such that the
source of either must not know anything about the contents of
the other.
The algorithm that provided this required multiple synchro-
nized sessions of activity from every voter. Here we propose
an algorithm that assumes collectors will not collude with each
other or with any voter, but that runs in constant time with no
need for synchronization between voters. Alone the collectors
still have no ability to deduce any voter’s location.
1) Chinese Remainder Theorem based Algorithm: In an
election with N voters, each collector Cj chooses a positive
prime number pj and creates a set Uj of unique numbers such
that |Uj | = N and ∀u ∈ Uj : pj > u where j = {1, 2}. Each
voter Vi receives pj and uji from both collectors where uji
is chosen from Uj ; thus each voter receives two primes (all
voters get the same primes) and two arbitrary numbers (each
collector never sends the same number to two different voters).
Vi thus has p1, p2, u1, u2, and finds the unique Li using the
following equation:
a = u1p2(p−12 mod p1)
b = u2p1(p−11 mod p2)
Li = (a+ b) mod p1p2
This is an application of the Chinese Remainder Theorem
(CRT), which states that for pairwise relatively prime positive
integers p1 . . . pr, distinct integers u1, . . . ur, and a system of
congruences:
x ≡ u1( mod p1)
x ≡ u2( mod p2)
. . .
x ≡ ur( mod pr)
There is a unique solution modulo K = p1 × p2 × · · · × pr
Thus, a unique voting location can be obtained by solving
for x, and as long as no collector obtains the information
generated by the other, all locations found are secret. While
CRT requires only relatively prime integers pj , requiring prime
numbers ensures that all pj are relatively prime without any
need for one collector to be aware of any other’s choice. A
proof of CRT is equivalent to proving the function X is a
bijection where X is a mapping: ZK → Zp1 × · · · × Zpr
and defined as X(x) = (x mod p1, . . . , x mod pr). A detailed
proof of CRT itself can be found in [22].
This algorithm scales to any number of collectors without
issue; as usual, only two collectors are mentioned for the
sake of simplicity. If one voter receives the same uji from
both collectors, that does not cause any problems. If voters
receive the same pj from both collectors, the algorithm cannot
proceed, and voters must report an error to the collectors,
who may simply generate new prime numbers and try again.
This is of little concern: if the collectors are generating
cryptographically secure prime numbers the likeliehood they
choose the same one is all but nonexistent, and even if they
do, the first voter to log in will report this error automatically,
it will be corrected with very minimal work, and all future
voters will not be affected.
2) Location Consolidation: The algorithm produces highly
discontinuous results. While guaranteed to be unique, the
outputs are by no means guaranteed to be close to each
other. This significantly increases the size of the voting vectors
because of the empty space, and could confuse voters who
expect N locations to be numbered 1, 2 . . . , N .
An optional step allows for continuous locations to be
generated from the discontinuous ones. A voter’s Absolute
Location is defined as the number generated by the algorithm
above, and if all voters treat theirs as the index of a candidate
and “vote” on them, doing no location shifting, the resulting
tally (called the Location Vector) will allow voters to reduce
their Absolute Location to a Relative Location, where the set
of all N Relative Locations will be exactly ZN .
Each voter obtains the Location Vector, finds the bit that
corresponds to their Absolute Location, and counts all the
1-bits that precede it. This Relative Location is the number
of Absolute Locations smaller than one’s own. This is still
guaranteed to be unique and anonymous, and adding 1 to
all locations prior to display in user interfaces produces the
desired 1, 2, . . . , N . This process is visualized in Fig. 1.
3) Security: The new algorithm breaches voter privacy if a
collector colludes with any voter. The old algorithm required
Obtain binary Location Vector: 10100101
Calculate Absolute Location L: 5
Find 2L within vector (bold): 10100101
Count 1s preceding own: 10100101
Relative Location is this count: 2
Fig. 1. Consolidating Locations Example
collectors to collude together, which is easier to secure against.
Thus, the new way is appropriate only when collectors can be
trusted not to collude with anyone, (alone they are still unable
to breach any voter’s privacy) the voters can be trusted not to
collude with collectors, (willingly or unwillingly) or the secret
data for location is not made available to anyone who might
collude. (Unlike ballots, nothing but the Location Vector must
be made public to achieve full transparency)
B. Multiple Winners
A special form of election involves multiple distinct choices
from a pool of candidates instead of a single choice. The
nature of voting vectors prohibits this: voters must choose
exactly 1 bit before encryption. Our solution forms such an
election as a set of distinct elections: one for every choice
voters are allowed. These sub-elections are called instances;
during vote tallying, the tallies of each election’s instances
are aggregated, and that aggregated tally is the one used to
determine winners. A “normal” election where voters get one
choice may be treated as an election with one instance.
The opposite case, where empty ballots are permitted to
be cast, is easily solved with no alteration to the protocol:
introduce an “Abstain” candidate to the election.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We have developed a prototype application suite that allows
for functional demonstration/use of the enhanced protocol,
implemented in PHP and Python.
A. Roles
Three distinct groups of people are involved in an election.
The administrator defines the election itself: what races are
being voted on, who the candidates are, whether or not a
given race is one of the multi-winner cases described in
Section III-B, what the time limits are (if there are any) to
each phase of the election, and who the collectors are (in the
form of web addresses). This information is stored in the JSON
format and distributed to the collectors.
The collectors maintain a database that keeps track of voter
usernames, the keys they use to encrypt their ballots, and
the uploads they submit. With the exception of the keys,
this information is publicly viewable on a page discussed in
Section IV-C. They run an application that automates all steps
of the protocol; human operators are needed only to set up the
application and ensure that everything runs as expected.
The voters are the people who actually vote for the candi-
dates. They are identified by a unique username, which may be
made public, which is secured with a password. At each phase
of the election, the voters use a web page to give the needed
information to the collectors. Since collectors interact with
voters independently of each other, the application obtains and
sends secure data to each of the collectors via asynchronous
javascript.
B. Phases
Activity is broken into four phases, three of which involve
the voters, one of which is optional, with a strictly observa-
tional fifth phase at the end.
1) Preliminary: Before the election is opened to voters, the
administrator must create the election file as described above
and distribute it to the collectors. The collectors, meanwhile,
must set up all necessary files on their servers. A web
application has been developed that allows the administrator
to easily specify necessary information for the election file,
and which automatically distributes that file to the collectors.
Once obtained, the collectors initialize their databases and
open Registration.
2) Registration: Voters choose a username and password
to send to the collectors. If the username is available, it is
stored in the databases, and that voter is now registered. For
private elections, this step could be integrated with a credential
check or could be bypassed altogether and voters could be
pre-registered by election officials. Whatever security checks
are necessary for registration occur at a higher level than the
election itself.
The administrator may specify a time when Registration
ends, or the collectors may manually force it to end using
a menu option. Either way, when Registration closes, the
collectors generate a share matrix for the location-vote and,
based on the settings of the election, open either Confirmation
or Voting.
3) Confirmation: This is an optional phase that serves to
consolidate locations as discussed in Section III-A2. Voters see
only a prompt for username and password, then a response.
However, the application quietly executes the steps to consol-
idate locations. Confirmation ends when all registered voters
confirm or an optional timeout occurs, whichever comes first.
Collectors tally and publish the Location Vector.
If this behavior is not needed, Confirmation may be skipped
with a setting in the election file. If pre-registration is in use,
Confirmation may act as voter registration. For example, if a
university wishes to conduct an election among its faculty, a
list of qualified voters could be generated and the Confirmation
phase could be used to establish voter participation. Qualified
but uninterested voters would not “register”, and would be
disqualified from the election after the timeout occurs.
4) Voting: Once Confirmation is finished, collectors com-
pensate for any unconfirmed voters and open Voting. Alterna-
tively, if Confirmation is not being done, collectors may open
Voting immediately after Registration closes with no additional
work done. During this phase, voters log in using their
usernames and passwords and are presented with the names
of the races and radio buttons corresponding to candidates.
Behind the scenes the application executes all that is necessary
to obtain voting location and prepare for encryption, which
may occur while the voter is making his or her choices. When
the voter is finished, a voting vector is generated for each
instance of each race and sent to the collectors. When all
voters vote or an optional admin-specified timeout occurs, the
collectors independently tally and publish the results and the
election ends. If collectors do not produce exactly the same
tally results, misbehavior has occurred at some level.
C. Transparency
The collectors maintain two web pages for the publishing
of data: first a Raw Results page that displays encrypted data
in real time during the election, and secondly an Interpreted
Results page that displays the tallied results after the election
is over. The Raw Results page is opened at the beginning
of Registration and acts as a dynamic bulletin board: during
Registration, it displays taken usernames as they are registered.
During Confirmation, it displays in yes-no format whether or
not that voter has confirmed. During Voting, it displays the
encrypted ballots (numbers) for each instance of each race as
they are cast. A snapshot of this page midway through the
Voting phase is pictured in Fig. 2.
The Interpreted Results page is opened at the close of the
election when the ballots are tallied and acts as the actual
results-viewer. At the top, it displays the winner(s) of each race
along with how many votes they obtained. Below, it displays
each location and the choices that voter made. Examples
of both are shown in Figures 4 and 3. Thus, anyone may
verify that the tallied results match perfectly the actual votes
cast, and any voter may verify that their location’s choices
are exactly the choices they made. As the encrypted ballots
are visible in the Raw Results page, anyone may run their
own tally and verify that the interpreted locations accurately
match what was cast. All of these verifications are done by
simple observation that anyone, even non-technical people, can
perform and understand.
V. COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we give a comparison between our newly
implemented prototype and the INFOCOM’14 protocol [25].
Then we briefly discuss the scalability of the protocol and
implementation.
TABLE I
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE INFOCOM’14 PROTOCOL AND OURS
Protocols This INFOCOM’14
Location anonymization 1 round multiple rounds
Allowed winners multiple limit to 1
A. Protocol Comparison
Table I lists the major difference of our implementation
comparing to the INFOCOM’14 protocol [25]. Since the
enhanced location anonymization scheme in our implemen-
tation requires only one round of interaction between voters
and collectors, thus dramatically decreases the communication
and synchronization cost. In addition, our implementation
Fig. 2. In-Progress Bulletin Board
Fig. 3. Full contents of all ballots
Fig. 4. Displaying winners (including ties)
allows multiple winners, so it can be applied to more election
scenarios in real life.
B. Scalability
The amount of random numbers that must be generated for
(N,N) Secret Sharing grows O(N2) and the size of the ballots
scales O(N) in the worst cases (the voters with the largest
locations). For a very large number of voters this is problem-
atic: the wait times resulting in sending enormous ballots could
become unacceptable. This is analogous to the traffic involved
with conducting a very large traditional election through a
single polling place, and has the same solution: a hierarchical
voting structure.
Rather than grouping all voters together, they would be
divided into precincts. Based on a survey by the US EAC
on voting booth based elections, the average precinct size for
a presidential election is approximately 1100 registered voters
as of 2004 [12]. Each precinct would conduct a separate tally
and merge the results. This would result in share quantity and
ballot sizes that scale with the precinct size, which can be
bounded at a level that produces acceptable performance in
all cases. The same collectors could manage all precincts,
virtualizing each one, or multiple pairs of collectors could
exist with precincts distributed among them. This latter case
introduces additional security: in a worst case scenario only a
fraction of the voters’ privacy would be exposed.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented our new algorithm, based on the Chinese
Remainder Theorem, for generating unique voting locations,
as well as our strategy for reconciling universally verifiable
voting vectors with multiple voting. We have introduced
and explained our prototype web implementation, including
previewing its interface and discussing its scalability.
The prototype implementation is exactly that: a prototype.
It is fully functional: it accurately demonstrates the protocol
and an election may be carried out using it; but it is still
in active development and many security vulnerabilities have
not yet been addressed. Along with addressing these, we are
continuing to refine the web interfaces for better usability.
Once the prototype is complete the system will be available
for use by anyone who wishes to run an election. We plan to
debut it for our department’s faculty tenure and promotion vot-
ing process, and it is appropriate for use by any organization
that wishes to have fully transparent internet voting, secured
by mutually restrained authorities.
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